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Chapter 8: FROM POWER TO KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIPS: STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS AS LEARNING PARTNERSHIP
1. Introduction
Since it progressively became a major topic in Management Science from the late eighties, the word ‘tradition’ can be used today to best describe stakeholder theory. Relations between the firm and stakeholders are ‘traditionally’ conceived on a single opposition axis introducing two main patterns of relations. On the one hand, stakeholders can intensify pressure over the firm thus, creating conflict. On the other hand, dialogue and partnership can be set through different methods, like the participation of NGOs in decision processes and strategic actions. In both cases, the patterns of relations are assumed to take place in the context of conflicting interests. This mode of conceptualising stakeholder relations places power as a core dimension shaping stakeholder relationships. It could be argued that, power relations seem to be the only imaginable relationships between the firm and those with who it interacts - its ‘interactors’. In such a context, institutionalising ‘fair contracts’ seems to be the only solution to overcome conflicting power relations. However, if such contracts are to be defined, it seems necessary to consider their possible content and the stakeholder relations they imply. 

As we have argued elsewhere (see Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005), the internal contradictions between on the one hand, the ideology of social good and on the other hand, the ideology of control are not fully accounted for in the way stakeholder theory is popularised in recent years. Our critique emphasises the need to engage with the underlying values that are at stake, thus, revealing the way stake-holder analysis unveils not only subjectivities but identities that are at stake. If we are to move the debate of stakeholder theory forward, we need to extend the ideology of stakeholder theory, which focuses on contractual arrangements based on power relations. 

In this chapter, we respond directly to this need by proposing an alternative dimension, which could also help us conceptualise contractual arrangements. We argue that stakeholder relations can be usefully examined through a knowledge lens. Conceptualising stakeholder relations as knowledge relations could be a useful way for rethinking the forces driving stakeholder relations. By drawing attention to the importance of knowledge and learning the role of interaction between stakeholders becomes more prominent. Interaction can be better understood as a source of value creation that can also positively affect accountable action. Unlike transactional models, which focus on one of relationships, interactions suggest a longer term relationship which both parties may be more inclined to invest in. The notion of a knowledge-based interaction as a way of rethinking stakeholder relations, leads us to also suggest an alternative type of contractual relationship between stakeholders. Instead of seeing stakeholders as standing in opposition to each other, we argue that knowledge-based interactions can foster learning partnerships. These learning partnerships re-enforce the interdependency between stakeholders as part of a wider social whole, where the attention is not on self-interest but on mutual interests. 

Drawing on ideas of Social Capital we introduce the notion of interdependency contract as a new mode of contractual arrangements underlying stakeholder relations. We seek to emphasise through these contracts the importance of pursuing mutual and collective interests. Interdependency contracts, we argue, place knowledge and learning not as commodities to be exchanged but as feedback systems supporting different communities of practice to develop. Feedback systems, as Antonacopoulou & Papamichail (2004) point out, reflect the social structures that support knowledge flows in organisations in the way existing lessons learned are codified, stored and distributed among members of a community. In the context of stakeholder relations, feedback systems would be a powerful means of supporting interdependency contracts in at least three ways. Firstly, by providing space for reflection on the actions of stakeholders thus, highlighting the impact of these actions on others helping to raise more prominently the need for greater understanding of the assumptions made. Secondly, the knowledge relied upon in taking a course of action can be made more explicit and thirdly, the importance of learning from experiences when stakeholders interact can be highlighted. Furthermore, feedback systems could help further exemplify the hidden issues that different stakeholders have at stake, highlighting that collective interests can still be political but potentially less damaging if enough diversity is accommodated in the interdependency contract. 

We discuss these issues in more detail and organise our analysis in three main sections. We present first a critique of the main theories of contracts in relation to theories of agents and their relationships. We distil from this discussion the various characteristics of stakeholder relationships. We then discuss and distinguish between power and knowledge-based stakeholder relationships to show the way interactions between stakeholders shape their motives and actions. We present the main principles underpinning our proposed interdependency contracts in the context of stakeholder learning partnerships and conclude with some suggestions for future stakeholder theory, research and practice.

2. Contractual arrangements underlying Stakeholder relations

The normative view of stakeholder theory holds that organisations should be run for the interest of all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Freeman & Evan (1990) refer to the theory of Coase (1937) to hold that relations between stakeholders cannot be conceived outside the formulation of these ‘fair contracts’. The normative stakeholder view supposes that relations between firms and stakeholders should be shaped according to a contractual model. Such an approach restricts relations to part-to-part agreements, which have to provide answers to essentially economic problems. In his attempt to ‘reconcile’ stakeholder theory and the nexus-of-contracts, Boatright (2002) defends that contracts are the only way to ensure constituencies' protection, and thus, the fairness of relationships. Hill & Jones (1992) transpose the principal-agent relation into the stakeholder paradigm to finally consider that managers ought to be the agents for all stakeholders. 

From the first part of the twentieth century, there have been numerous attempts to formalise contract-based theories of organisations. Before becoming interpretative standards, those theories were proposing possible explanations to the development of firms (as alternative shapes of organisations, see Ouchi, 1980). The successive views on contractual relations seem to follow a cumulative pattern. Historical reviews could show that, in this particular domain as for many management fields of research, each new theoretical framework is built over the assumptions of the preceding ones. As we tried to show elsewhere, this process based on ‘generalisation-by-absorption’ (Méric, 2003) can be understood as an attempt to improve the legitimacy of new theoretical corpuses. Though such an attitude is in no way a passport for scientificity (Antonacopoulou & Méric, 2005), it seems that stakeholder theory followed this model. Using altogether the key hypotheses of contractual theories, the stakeholder view has become integral to management discourse. 

The first contributions in contract-based approaches are focused on intra-organisational relations. When considering the main reasons why firms should be preferred to markets, Coase (1937) introduces long term contracts as an alternative to market relations, which could help save transaction costs. Firms are supposed to exist when an entrepreneur holds the power to decide how to allocate resources. According to Simon (1957), in the case of job contracts, co-contractors agree on the wages and on the procedure to follow in order to determine precisely which tasks have to be achieved. But neither Simon nor Coase explore the problems that can emerge once such contracts are applied (especially once resources have been allocated). Management by Objectives (MBO) pragmatically answers this concern (Drucker, 1954). The acceptance of short-term objectives strictly follows the contractual model. As a conceptual framework, agency theory helps analyze both intra and extra-organisational (though focused on shareholders and in a lesser extent, on creditors) delegation and control relations. The agency relationship is conceived as ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on his or her behalf which involves some decision-making authority to the agent’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). In such a theoretical context, relations are built around two main dimensions. First, delegation allows the agent to act and to make decisions instead of the principal. To be able to do so, the agent is provided with specific resources. Then, control processes concur to reduce informational asymmetry. They focus on results and on a certain scope of methods, but they are supposed to guarantee the agent's autonomy in the accomplishment of his/her tasks. Agency contracts are said to be fair when specific conditions are met, that is to say:
-	if relevant resources are chosen,
-	if the principal does not interfere with the agent,
-	if informational feedback allows the appraisal of the agent’s efficacy and efficiency. 

As a result, if contracts are to determine the only way to shape stakeholder relations, the transactional model of the firm implies that the concepts of legitimacy (to enter a contractual agreement), of the informational function, and of global fairness can be generalised to other social actors. But, as we already showed (Antonacopoulou & Méric, 2005), it seems extremely hard to succeed in this attempt. First of all, one can hardly extend the concept of legitimacy outside the classical principal-agent relation. For instance, including ‘nature’ or its representatives (customers or pressure groups) into a contractual relation is closer to metaphor than to effective contracts. Moreover, the role of information cannot be the same when comparing, for example, investors and NGOs. The first category of stakeholders is expecting business information that can help determine if the contractual relation is worth investing in. The second one is seen as a potential source of problems that has to be convinced not to vie with the firm. Lastly, the ‘fair contract’ model cannot be extended to the entire set of external or internal actors. In light of these issues, one might ask what would be the obligation of communities or of pressure groups towards a company? If such a relation were to exist, it would mean that firms are able to control any shape of counter-power, resorting into a range of ‘non-aggressive’ pacts. 

Perhaps this sudden greed for ‘contracts’ in stakeholder relations can be explained through the underpinning assumption that, outside contractual agreements, the only possible links between firms and stakeholders are based on power. Even in the critical perspective offered by Sutton and Arnold (1998), multilateral contracts are proposed as an alternative to always advantaging ‘the mightier’. 

Leanna & Rousseau (2000) propose to leave the classical contractual pattern. They suggest that relationships should be preferred to transactions in the process of organisational wealth creation. Transactions can be a one-time only agreement, whereas relationships suppose continuity and ambiguity (they can include either conflicts or collaborative relations). Post, Preston & Sachs (2002) seem definitive about getting rid of the contractual model, when proposing that ‘stakeholders in a firm are individuals and constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity […]’ (op. cit., p. 6). The possible absence of willingness excludes any shape of formal or even informal contracts, at least part-to-part ones.

This discussion reinforces the argument that the dominant stakeholder view seems to mix declared empiric observations and the generalization of contractual models (Antonacopoulou & Méric, 2005). Self-evidence is often confused with an empirical approach. This is obviously the case with the descriptive and instrumental sides of stakeholder theory. This ideological mixture, paradoxically, leads to adopt extremely restrictive conceptions of what is supposed to be an “extended enterprise”. What companies see as being their stakeholders cannot be supposed to define the only set of stakeholders. Such an attitude not only hinders any shape of comprehensive analysis, but it may also lead to neglect social ‘weak links’ (Granovetter, 1973). Furthermore, focusing on a restricted set of stakeholders may foster companies to consider them as more important as they actually are. For instance, assuming that competitors do not belong to the field of stakeholders ignores the fact that they and the firm could work together for the general interest of their industry (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002). These statements lead us to consider that the definition of stakeholders is closely linked with the way relational nets between social actors are visualised. 

Would it be possible to leave the contractual approach of stakeholders to propose a new definition of these actors? This is an important question and this would also call for a need to analyse agents and their relation in the context of who is included in the frame. This implies that often stakeholder perspectives may be limited to those actors/players that are seen as part of the picture (a particular situation/problem) at a particular point in time. Thus, proposing predetermined lists of stakeholders or inserting stakeholder relationships into far too simple models may contribute to worsen the organisation’s perceptive limitations. For instance, the classical proposition based on part-to-part contracts is underpinned by the assumption that stakeholders and firms only develop power or economic relations. Restricting the relational scope to political or economic matters, as an attitude, is much more theoretical than it is empirical. This does not reflect a holistic view of the multiple and complex stakeholder relationships and it is therefore, critical in understanding agents and their relationships to also understand how they are framed and how these frames are inclusive as much as they are exclusive of some actors. In rethinking stakeholder theory therefore, we need to think about ways of re-framing stakeholder analysis by drawing attention not only to the diverse and often competing interests of different actors, but also the way they interact and the ways in which their interactions reinforce their interdependencies. In extending the stakeholder view we adopt a phenomenological approach focusing on interactions between social actors in relation to the underlying forces that underpin their relationship. One such force that supports stakeholder interactions is knowledge. We explore this issue next.
3. Stakeholders as ‘Interactors’: Knowledge-based relationships
If we adopt the phenomenological presupposition that ‘organisations are what they do and perceive’, as Post, Preston & Sachs (2002) suggest, then the definition of stakeholders that is based on the ‘impact’ view is not satisfactory any longer. When a situation is said to be ‘at stake’, it usually means that somebody has to win or to lose something if the situation occurs or not. Thus, what is ‘at stake’ for any actor regarding an organisation means ‘what this actor could lose or win if the organisation does so or not’. Concretely speaking, when a refinery rejects poisonous rubbish inside a river, the inhabitants of the area can be contaminated. This has nothing to do directly with the organisational objectives, but it is related with how the company actually acts. When the same inhabitants set a specific association to complain about the human damages of such operations, they develop a new shape of action. In fact, they are interacting with the company. In such a situation, there is no matter of control, just interaction. Of course, the organisation's responsibility is at stake, but it does not refer to any shape of part-to-part contract. Contractual accountability is replaced with the responsibility for how the organisation is acting. There is no measurement for this type of responsibility, just problems that may occur due to interaction. What matters with what the organisation does cannot be reduced to a certain scope of objectives and measures. Last but not least, this situation has nothing to do with power relations. In this specific context, the association cannot be considered as a pressure group. It is just a group of actors who matter with the consequences of a very narrow set of the company's actions. Interpreting this situation through the prism of power relations would reduce the scope of possible interactions between organisations and stakeholders, a well as the scope of possible responses from each constituency. 

This first step in our critical analysis leads us to choose a phenomenological definition of stakeholders: individuals or groups of individuals that interact – or can interact - with the organisation. But is it enough to re-interpret the stakeholder view? It is now necessary to consider the scope of possible interactions, and to explore if all of them are actually taken into account in the “traditional” stakeholder view.

Considerations over interactions enlarge the scope of stakeholder relations. Nevertheless, the commonly used definitions of these actors are often embedded in a restricted conception of possible relationships. Management science distinguishes three dimensions in stakeholder relationships: descriptive, instrumental, and normative (see Freeman & Reed, 1983; Windsor, 1998). Though scholars seem to have acknowledged this three-dimensional characteristic, it sounds difficult for practitioners not to adopt a single stakeholder approach, where identification methods, wealth-creation objectives and moral concerns are considered altogether.

Instrumental and moral matters are mixed with the firm's interests (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002), as far as Ethics are supposed to ‘pay’. Companies that acknowledge individual integrity avoid the costs due to crises, and improve their aura within the professional community. They finally gather together the conditions for surviving inside competitive markets. Even when initial considerations are ‘Ethical’, though not the only ones (Koll, 2003), the firm’s interests are mainly focusing on the economic impact (Greenley & Foxall, 1998). As a result, leaving the transactional pattern does not provide a sufficient basis to analyse stakeholder relations in wider terms other than economic ones.

Stakeholder relationships include all forms of relations established by the company with its stakeholders. These relationships could be licensing agreements, partnering agreements, financial relations, contracts and arrangements about distribution channels. The stakeholder relationships include also customer loyalty, company names and brand image, which represent a fundamental link between the company and its stakeholders (Neely & Adams, 2002). 

Nevertheless, even extensive views of continuous relationships are often, and once again, limited to economic considerations. This phenomenon could be described as what Granovetter (1985) calls the ‘undersocialisation’ phenomenon: organisations, just as individuals, are supposed to maximise their utility on competitive markets, excluding influence and social contacts. Those contacts, on the contrary, would hinder the necessary competitive game between companies. In such a context, firms have demands or expectations towards their stakeholders. Their duties or responsibility are restricted to a set of reciprocal commitments. Many analyses of these demands are proposed in the literature. Table 8.1 presents a brief synthesis of these various contributions provided by Neely & Adams (2002).

Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) introduce the role of salience and argue that the degree to which one stakeholder can succeed in getting its claims or interests ranked high in other stakeholders' agendas is a neglected aspect of stakeholder theory. In their view stakeholder theory is unable to answer this question, because much emphasis is placed on the issue of legitimacy or normative appropriateness. Theorists grant disproportionate weight to the contractual or moral rightness or wrongness of a stakeholder's claims and relationship to the firm. While legitimacy is an important variable, two other factors must be considered when mapping out stakeholder class relationships. One factor consists of power defined as the ability to influence the actions of other stakeholders and to bring out the desired outcomes. This is done through the use of coercive-physical, material-financial and normative-symbolic resources at one's disposal. The other factor is that of urgency or attention-getting capacity. This is the ability to impress the critical and pressing character of one's claims or interests, goals that are time-sensitive and will be costly if delayed.
Table 8.1: Typical demands towards stakeholders
Typical stakeholders	Demands from organisations
Investors	capital for growth, greater risk-taking, long-term support
Customers	profitability, retention, loyalty, advocacy, feedback
Intermediaries	planning forecasts, forward demand visibility
Employees	flexibility, multi-skilling, antisocial hours, suggestions
Suppliers	more outsourcing, fewer vendors, total solutions, integration
Regulators	cross-border consistency, informal advice, early involvement
Communities	skilled employment pool, grants, support, integration
Pressure Groups	closer co-operation, shared research, co-branding
Alliance Partners	cross-selling, co-development, cost sharing

These three ‘other-directed’ attributes (legitimacy, power, urgency) are highly variable; they are socially constructed; and they can be possessed with or without consciousness and will. They can also intersect or be combined in multiple ways, such that stakeholder salience will be positively related to the cumulative number of attributes effectively possessed (Mitchell et al., 1997: 865, 868-70, 873). All three factors must be considered simultaneously in that ‘power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exercise through urgency’ (Mitchell et al., 1997: 869). These dimensions are employed to build a typology of stakeholders reflecting variable degrees of salience and types of relationship, thus distinguishing between definitive, dominant, dependent, dormant, discretionary and demanding stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997) define each category in the following way:
-	‘Definitive’ stakeholders are those who possess all three attributes and will therefore receive the greatest stakeholders are those who possess power and are perceived as having legitimate claims.
-	‘Dependent’ stakeholders are those whose claims are deemed legitimate and urgent.
-	‘Dangerous’ stakeholders are those who possess power and have claims that are urgent though not legitimate. 
-	‘Dormant’ are the least salient stakeholders i.e. they are powerful but with claims that are deemed neither urgent nor legitimate).
-	‘Discretionary’ stakeholders are those who have legitimacy without power and urgency, and 
-	‘Demanding’ stakeholders are those who have urgency without power or legitimacy. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) use a general category referred to as ‘nonstakeholder’ to account for all those who possess none of these attributes into a residual category.

The demands from organisations as well the categories proposed above reflect the often one-sided approach in which stakeholder relationships may be pursued. This creates a tension that soon introduces self-interest as the underlying principle of interaction. Theoretically speaking, such an attitude could be resolved through the institutionalisation of part-to-part contracts and as we have already explained in the previous section why transactional contracts cannot provide a satisfactory framework for analysing stakeholder relations. Thus, the main bases for our re-consideration of stakeholder relations have to be found elsewhere.

When considering practice, as Neely & Adams (2002) argue, the needs and wants of the organisation from its stakeholders are constantly in dialogue: ‘We would suggest that gaining a clear understanding of the ‘dynamic tension’ that exists between what stakeholders want and need from the organisation, and what the organisation wants and needs from its stakeholders, can be an extremely valuable learning exercise for the vast majority of corporations and, especially, their respective business units’.

Here lies an important complementary approach to the phenomenological definition we propose above. The view of winners and losers in stakeholders relations and a search for ‘what is at stake’ spontaneously leads to restrict the relations to self-interest. Self-interests reflect gains and losses. However, they neglect the different perspectives that emanate from different knowledge bases and understandings. ‘Interaction’ has numerous meanings. Once again, restricting this term to its economic or political signification reveals a very poor conception of what the relations between the firm and stakeholders can be. Thus, it delivers an incomplete definition of stakeholders. Beyond politics and purely economic considerations, stakeholders and firms interact in the meaning of Mead (1934) or of Berger & Luckmann (1966). Interaction is not only material or tangible, but also symbolic. 

Stakeholders take part to the company’s knowledge creation process. This participation occurs at least at the level of ‘being here’. Even by merely existing and acting in the economic, political or social environment helps the company structure its own reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Beyond this minimum level of cognitive interaction, stakeholders bear their own realities that can be crossed with the one of the firm. According to cybernetic models of learning (Katz & Kahn, 1966), they also provide companies with variously formulated informational feedback. It is the case, for instance, of mass media, which are not commonly included in the traditional set of specific stakeholders. The common way of considering media in management science is often limited to their instrumentality as communication vectors (i.e. media planning, for instance), as if, in practice, the non-instrumental feedback on strategic, financial or environmental policies had no impact on the way businesses are run. As far as learning is concerned, firms may take a greater advantage from non-instrumental stakeholders than from completely controllable ones. 

Stakeholder relationships compose a platform for building intentional or unintentional ‘learning partnerships’. In the same way as competition is seen as ‘co-opetition’ (Bradenburger & Nalebuff 1996, Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002), equally stakeholder relations can be repositioned as ‘interdependency contracts’ based on learning and knowledge sharing. We explore these issues in relation to social capital in the next section.
4. Stakeholder Learning Partnerships: A Case for the Interdependency Contract

The discussion so far has highlighted the importance of recognising the various elements at stake that shape stakeholder relations. Beyond power, transactions, and self-interest we need to also acknowledge the importance of emotion and moral judgements (Lozano, 2005). In the context of the moral agenda, Burton & Dunn (1996) highlight the utilitarian and deontological versions of moral judgement. Drawing on Feminist philosophy the moral agenda moves beyond the notion of contracts having a moral dimension. Instead, as Burton & Dunn (1996) point out, a key dimension of contracts is also care, which in their view reinforces the importance of action and with that responsibility. The proposition is that where there is responsible action there is also interdependency. However, it is one thing recognising that there are multiple and competing interests and quite another seeking out to understand and respond to the issues that are the best interest of other stakeholders. This relational mode of engagement highlights the importance of building and maintaining relationships rather than merely managing them (Lozano, 2004). 

The emphasis on managing connections and enhancing the interaction between different stakeholders in society lies at the core of the idea of ‘social capital’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Lin et al., 2001; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). The dimensions of social capital advanced by Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) sensitise us both to the nature of interaction between stakeholders as well as the underlying motives and actions, which guide the way stakeholders are connected in a complex web of relationships. They distinguish between three dimensions of social capital: the ‘structural’, the ‘relational’ and the ‘cognitive’ dimension. 

The ‘structural’ dimension emphasises the nature of connections through information channels that reduce time and investment required to gather information. Networking becomes a central practice in stakeholders’ efforts to reinforce connections with others, recognising and valuing obligations, identifying themselves by sharing values and norms and emphasising the importance of trust. These are the very elements, which constitute the ‘relational’ dimension of social capital. Connections can only take place if the various constituencies appreciate the importance of interpersonal relations, obligations, norms and traditions. This point also suggests that beyond explicit efforts to communicate clearly assumptions, perceptions and expectations, there is a ‘cognitive’ dimension that implies that tacitly the mental models, the subtleties in day to day interactions, the shared narratives and language also play an important part in the process of developing a working net of connections between stakeholders. The three dimensions of social capital reinforce the importance of interdependency between stakeholders. Importantly, though these dimensions also emphasise the importance of interdependency based on interconnectivity. This point suggests that stakeholders do not only interact in relation to a set of practices which demand that they work together. More fundamentally, stakeholders interact because they share common interests and depend on each other to accomplish these. A key challenge therefore, for stakeholder relations is the nature of collaboration and in particular the means by which the possible partnerships that are essential for interconnectivity and interdependency are developed.

We would argue that knowledge and learning would be two key processes, which would influence the way stakeholder relations are formed. We suggest therefore, that stakeholder learning partnerships would be critical in supporting the development of interdependency contracts. Learning partnerships would not only colour stakeholder relations in a more positive tone. They would also shape the way in which stakeholders interact. The workings of stakeholder interactions as a learning partnership is not simply a set of moral obligations and connections based on knowledge, nor is it simply a set of structured learning practices intended to support the creation, storage and dissemination of mutually valued knowledge. More fundamentally, learning partnerships are based on knowing – the way knowledge and learning are socially constructed in practices (Brown & Duguid, 2001).  Therefore, when we refer to learning partnerships and knowledge-based stakeholder relations, our focus on knowing reflects our effort to embrace not only information dissemination but also ways of understanding, insight, skills, expertise that lie both at a personal/individual and collective levels and are manifested in practices – activities, actions and interactions (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2002; Berends, Boersma & Weggeman, 2003). Our emphasis on knowing in relation to modes of interaction between stakeholders, can also be usefully located in much current thinking in relation to the idea of communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2000). The main tenet of this theory in relation to ideas of social capital is that practitioners within a community share insights as much as they share common routines. Embedded in their actions is the inherent interdependency that influences not only the reasons as to why they are connected but also the ways in which they are connected and the activities that help reinforce their reliance on each other to achieve both their personal and collective interests. Stakeholders are therefore, not only ‘interactors’ but they are members of communities of practices and as actants they build connections that create networks sustaining the interaction and interdependency between stakeholders. It is this interdependency that also transforms networks from simple connections to a dynamic complex working net of interactions. 

Defined as an ‘interactor’ (or interactant) a stakeholder could be considered a part of organisational learning processes. Instead of focusing on the way stakeholders should be approached in a political model, we suggest that ‘positive’ effects can emerge from their interacting with the organisation. In other words, when individuals have to take into account their organisation's relation to other actors, they could consider it as a learning opportunity. Taking into consideration this new perspective of ‘stakeholdership’ may highlight the learning processes that can be shaped outside or across the organisational frontiers. Therefore, the connections that different stakeholders create as they interact are both a source of learning and a space for learning. The latter not only broadens the agenda of learning beyond organisational specific issues, it also paves the way for learning differently (i.e. in non organisational determined ways). The challenges that stakeholders present the firm are as much to do with the way it learns as it is with the way it operates. Perhaps it is these challenges, in learning to act differently that introduces the power of learning partnerships that stakeholder interactions could entail.

The importance, benefits and challenges of collaborative learning have attracted considerable attention across a range of literatures, most prominently of which relate to studies of collaboration and inter-organizational alliances (Inkpen, 2002; Bergquist et al, 1995). Several commentators acknowledge that inter-organizational learning can lead to a series of planned and unplanned learning outcomes (Beamish & Berdrow, 2003; Hardy et al., 2003; Nooteboom, 2000). Ingram’s (2002, p. 642) definition of interorganizational learning highlights the kinds of learning possibilities which might be evidenced in practice: ‘Interorganizational learning occurs when one organization causes a change in the capacities of another, whether through experience sharing, or by somehow stimulating innovation’. Recent studies have also illustrated that knowledge creation and transfer (Mothe & Quélin, 2000), learning new ways of interacting and structuring collaboration (Benson-Rea & Wilson, 2003), as well as improved performance of collaborative entities (Zollo et al., 2002) are also some of the potential learning outcomes. Hibbert & Huxham (2004) integrate the various perspectives on learning from partnerships and collaborations and develop a theoretical model that identifies five sets of characteristics of collaborative situations, which could have a bearing on the learning outcomes. The boundaries between these categories are blurred and inter-relationships can be identified between these elements, which are: 
-	Partner complexity –diversity, culture; 
-	Structural characteristics – network and / or partnership forms;
-	Management style / stance – participative or controlling;
-	Knowledge characteristics – explicit and tacit;
-	Understanding and experience – learning, the field of enquiry, collaboration.
All these factors combine to create a series of ‘learning trajectories’ which as Hibbert & Huxham’s (2004) point out, could emerge as a result of the attitudes to learning and the patters of engagement in the way learning partnerships are formed. In particular, they show three learning trajectories based on the ways in which partners in a collaborative setting engage with each of the collaborative characteristics. They idenfify a ‘selfish’, a ‘sharing’ or a ‘sidelined’ learning trajectory which they summarise in relation to the collaborative characteristics as a set of behaviours. We reproduce their summary as Table 8.2.




Management style	Controlling	Partnering	Partnering or controlling?
Experienced needed	Learning	Combinations	Learning or collaborating?
Knowledge ‘obtainable’ (mode of knowing)	Largely explicit	Explicit or tacit	Could support either?

This analysis highlights not only the opportunities of learning partnerships but also the challenges. In proposing learning as a core dimension of stakeholder interactions we do not negate the challenges of competing priorities among partners (in this case stakeholders). Evidently, issues like self-interest in learning attitude, remain a force affecting the nature of engagement between stakeholders. However, we would argue that by making these attitudes more explicit this may help to inform the choices about the learning possibilities that are more malleable in relation to the nature of the engagement sought. This as Hibbert & Huxham (2004, p. 11) argue, could be a way in which certain learning possibilities can be enabled while others suppressed, in defining the nature of engagement which can preserve the individual and yet interconnected nature of learning. 

Another challenge in learning partnerships amongst stakeholders is that categories of stakeholders cannot be the same for all individuals, a fortiori for all organisations. Berger & Luckmann (1966) do insist on the fact that the interactive construction of one's reality is partly shared with other actants, and partially due to individual interpretations. This means that each individual possesses his/her own view of each stakeholder's characteristics and the extend to which they with to interact with them and can learning from their interaction. For instance, even ‘shareholders’ are not perceived within the same frames whether you address a top manager or an operational one. Social distance, emotional artefacts and perceived actions differ from one point to another inside and outside the organisation.

If we assume that individuals within the organisations build their own representations of stakeholders, it seems necessary to examine how they categorise social actors as potential or actual stakeholders. This should be the first step in the examination of learning partnerships. As far as cognitive psychology is concerned, There are at least three ways to conceive categorisation processes. For the purpose of our discussion we describe them as: 
-	the classical (or attributive) categorisation, 
-	the prototypical view, and
-	the dynamic approach.

The classical theory of categorisation conceives categories as sets of elements with common properties. Objectivist conceptions of categories are based on the assumption that ‘common properties’ are given data (Lakoff, 1987). It may be a quite naïve assumption regarding the experiential dimension of interaction. There is always somebody defining and perceiving the criteria to be taken into account in the construction of a specific set of elements. As far as stakeholder identification is concerned, the attributive view on categorisation offers wide perspectives in research as well as for situational interpretations, especially when considering the role of personal and interpersonal beliefs in the construction of stakeholder sets. Nevertheless, it leaves limited space to analyse the impact of interactions onto the evolution of such categories in the mind of organisation members.

Rosch (1978) proposes an alternative theory based on category prototypes. Categories are still sets in which some elements are considered better representatives than others. This approach assumes that trying to build a complete list of specific attributes is impossible or at least extremely reductive. The representativeness of one element depends on its distance to a salient element named ‘prototype’. This prototype may exist, but it can be an abstract construct also. Lorenz (1981) tested the case of geese that can confuse a wooden egg with a real one because of the similarity to their own prototype of eggs. This approach supposes one’s ability to build the archetype from nowhere, which sounds also quite naïve, or from experience. This specific point of view highlights the importance of learning dynamics in the identification process of stakeholders. It also allows us to consider ‘stakeholders’ as too wide a category to be built around one single prototype. This sensitises further to the difficulty faced by individuals in gathering so many different interactors inside a single set. Prototypicality fosters the use of inquiries based on changing fuzzy sets, which induces the acknowledgement of possible evolutions, not to say instability, in the categorization of stakeholders. In other words, an actant that is considered today as a stakeholder may be forgotten tomorrow until the next interaction. If learning is a major factor for organisational development, we cannot neglect forgetting as a structuring variable in the definition of stakeholders (Carmona & Grönlund, 1998).

The dynamic approach of categorisation is underpinned by the observation of mnemonic limitations. Though there is strong evidence for the stability of categories, recent research holds that there is no room enough in our brains for constantly context-adapting categories. As Clark (1993) contends, ‘it seems implausible to suppose that the gradations are built into some pre-existing conceptual unit or prototype that has been simply extracted whole out of long-term memory’ (op. cit., p. 93). Prototypes, even if they provide interesting models, seem hard to find in an empirical study, or they will be extremely volatile constructs. Thus, stakeholders should be taken as representations of transient constructs, and not as a stable lists like the ones proposed by traditional stakeholder theories.

This short, incursion into the field of cognitive science allows us to set the main properties of what a stakeholder as a ‘cognitive interactor’ could be. First a social actant can be considered as a stakeholder when it starts interacting with the organisation or its members. The stakeholder then enters the organisational cognitive space or what Bouquet et. al., 2000) call ‘attention management’. This situation lasts as long as the interaction does, or as long as the stakeholder remains within the organization’s frame (i.e. they remain relevant and have not been forgotten). A stakeholder will be categorised as a representative of the organisation’s own category for an undetermined period of time. Thus, ‘interdependency contracts’, for many cases, have no pre-specified duration nor content. Such an assumption could appear confusing, if it did not offer development, and particularly learning opportunities to organisations.  

The multiplicity, but also the ‘evolutionary skills’ of stakeholders must also be considered as a chance. When considering program evaluation, Guba & Lincoln (1989) suggest crossing different stakeholders’ points of view to launch the negotiation process: ‘The major purpose of this process is not to justify one’s own construction or to attack the weaknesses of the constructions offered by the others, but to form a connection between them that allows their mutual exploration by all parties’ (op. cit., p. 149).

The one-sided stakeholder view, ignores this type of interactions, and neglects the opportunities that they offer. One such opportunity emerges only if the attention shifts from instrumental and competitive views to co-operative patterns. Guba & Lincoln (1989) particularly insist on the necessity of regrouping ‘interactors’ that are ready to enter a dialectic process, that is to say actors that accept to share influence and power, instead of maintaining conflicting or power relations.

The key to interdependency contracts is the recognition of the value of different perspectives that can inform organisational practices. Different perspectives as a basis for effective actions, reflects a commitment to learning and a culture geared to not only accountability, but also responsibility in conducting business. Therefore, if the term ‘contract’ is still to be used, we have to consider it essentially as ‘metaphorical’ terms, just as Rousseau did in his Social Contract (1762). The conceptualisation of contracts in the context of relationships could be based on the ‘interdependency contract’ pattern. This conceptual model is neither psychological nor legal, but based on mutual accountability and responsibility. This view of contracts is not driven by self-interest but by mutual and collective interests.
5. Conclusions
This chapter sought to provide a new conceptualisation of stakeholder relations beyond power and economics to more fully embrace the power of knowing. In doing so, it has sought to problematize current conceptualisations of contracts and the role of agents in contractual relations. One of the main criticisms cast over current conceptualisations of stakeholder relations based on contracts is the limited interaction that they permit among stakeholders. By casting power and political agendas driven by self-interests, as the basis of conceptualising stakeholder relations, we fail to fully appreciate the possibilities there are for knowledge and learning to play an equally important part in shaping stakeholder relations. By adopting a focus on interaction rather than exchange, we highlight the wider space for interconnectivity among stakeholders. This interconnectivity highlights only more clearly the interdependency between stakeholders. This interdependency is based on the many complementarities that exist among stakeholders. Complementarities can generate greater willingness for care to be the driving force underpinning interactions between stakeholders. This care can also be founded on the mutual interests identified, which can be constructively explored by opening up greater possibilities for learning in partnership with and from each other. 

Learning partnerships and interdependency contracts are not a panacea. They are means of exploring the complexity of social relationships and the challenges for these social relationships to be sustained. One such challenge is the integration of the multiple and often completing forces which underpin the connection between actors and the structures they create. For example in stakeholder relations the multiple and completing interests reflect not only the importance of emotional and moral commitment. Equally important is the role of reflexive critique (Antonacopoulou, 2004) in embracing learning as a fundamental relation to interacting with others for mutual benefit. Central to reflexive critique is reflexive practice, which builds on the dynamic interaction between reflection and action with an intention to learn and to change. The dynamic relationship between learning and changing allows a closer look at the political dynamics of reflexivity and highlights critique as a critical dimension in organizing reflection. 

By looking closer at the politically situated and constructed nature of learning in the context of changing relations we come closer to the organizing processes which underpin the way stakeholders engage with the tensions they seek to manage. In the context of interdependency contracts reflexive critique encourages a mode of knowing that exposes the situated nature of learning. These issues open up a new phase in stakeholder debate and have a number of theoretical, empirical and practical implications. 

On a practical level, the idea of learning partnerships embedded in interdependency contracts opens up new opportunities to think critically about who is perceived to be a stakeholder and why. Such inquiry is as much about enhancing the opportunities to connect with new partners, as much as it is also about reconnecting with existing stakeholders in both cases driven by the desire to learn from and with others. Whilst this view provides a more positive re-conceptualisation of stakeholder relations beyond power-based relationships, it does not and should not be considered as an end in itself. We are not suggesting here that all learning is good as clearly this is not the case (Contu et al., 2003). The role and nature of learning in the context of stakeholder interactions emerges as a field of further research and provides important space for theoretical development. 

The current literature on organizational learning, inter-organisational learning and learning in relation to collaboration while relevant and insightful to stakeholder theory does not fully account for the unique quality of the learning phenomenon in the context of stakeholder interactions. The notion of mutual interest or truce is easier said than done. Socio-political tensions still remain a fundamental and currently unexplored set of issues that call for further theoretical and empirical research. Theoretically there is a clear implication about the insufficiency of current learning theory to fully account for the nature of learning and knowing in and across communities of practice beyond inter-organizational collaborations and in relation to interdependency contracts in stakeholder relations. Therefore, there is a need for the development of future learning theory in relation to interdependency-based relationships. 

Finally and perhaps most fundamentally, if we are to truly develop stakeholder theory and knowledge-based relationships between stakeholders we also need to invest in empirical research that can more fully test the propositions that are currently underpinning our theoretical positions. In testing and further developing stakeholder theory based on the dimensions proposed so far, perhaps the ultimate challenge is not the empirical research as such but the need for methodologies which can help us more fully unpack the complex phenomenon of stakeholder relations, the ways these are formed and developed over time. Beyond the fundamental concerns of stakeholder categorization outside theoretically predefined catalogues, issues of space and time would be particularly critical not only in relation to stakeholder interactions. 

These issues are also critical in relation to learning and social complexity (see Antonacopoulou & Chiva, 2005; Antonacopoulou, 2002). Beyond longitudinal, inductive research designs we need participative action research approaches that enable us to come closer to the phenomenon of stakeholder as interactant, the phenomenon of knowing in stakeholder relations and the phenomenon of interdependency in the ways social relationships emerge in ‘socio-contractual’ terms. Such inquiry does not only call for multi-methodological designs that would need to be rich to capture the social complexity, they would also need to draw from a much wider set of disciplinary perspectives if the phenomenon is to be more fully understood. By opening the debate and raising these implications, our intension is to find ways of reconnecting not only stakeholder relations but also strengthen the relationship between the practice of stakeholder relations and the underlying theories supporting the way it evolves in time and space. We would argue that this would make for a more dynamic conceptualisation of the social complexity of stakeholder relationships.
Bibliography
E. P. Antonacopoulou and J. Méric, ‘A Critique of Stake-holder Theory: Management Science or a Sophisticated Ideology of Control?’, Corporate Governance, vol. 5, n°2 (Emerald Group, 2005) 22-33.
E. P. Antonacopoulou and R. Chiva, ‘Social Complex Evolving Systems: Implications for Organizational Learning’, under review  (2005).
E. P. Antonacopoulou, ‘Learning as Space: Implications for Organisational Learning’, Manchester Business School Research Paper series, n° 443 (2002).
E. P. Antonacopoulou and  K. N. Papamichail, ‘Learning-Supported Decision-Making: ICTs as Feedback Systems’, in Doukidis, G., Mylonopoulos, N. and Pouloudi, M. (Eds), Information Society or Information Economy? A Combined Perspective on the Digital Era (Idea Group Publishing, 2004) 271-288.
E. P. Antonacopoulou, ‘The Dynamics of Reflexive Practice: The Relationship between Learning and Changing’, in Reynolds, M. and Vince, R. (Eds) Organizing Reflection (London: Ashgate, 2004) 47- 64.
P. Beamish, and I. Berdrow, ‘Learning From IJVs: The Unintended Outcome’, Long Range Planning, vol. 36, n° 3 (2003) 285-303.
M. Benson-Rea and H. Wilson, ‘Networks, Learning and the Lifecycle’, European Management Journal, vol. 21, n° 5 (2003) 588-597.
H. Berends, K. Boersma and M. Weggeman, ‘The Structuration of Organizational Learning’, Human Relations, vol. 56, n° 9 (2003) 1035-1056.
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann T. The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
Bergquist, W., Betwee, J. and  Meuel, D.  Building Strategic Relationships (San Francisco: Jossey Bass,1995).
J. R. Boatright, ‘Contractors as Stakeholders: Reconciling Stakeholder Theory with the Nexus-of-contracts Firm’, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 26 (2002) 1837-1852.
C. Bouquet, A. Morrison and A. Beck. ‘Global Strategy, Attention Management and Company Performance’, Academy of International Business Annual Meeting  (Phoenix, 2000).
Bradenburger, A. M. and Nalebuff, B. J. Co-Opetition : A Revolution Mindset That Combines Competition and Cooperation : The Game Theory Strategy That's Changing the Game of Business (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
J. Brown and P. Duguid, ‘Knowledge and Organization: A Social Practice Perspective’, Organization Science, vol. 12, n° 2 (2001) 198-213.
B. K. Burton and C. P. Dunn, ‘Feminist Ethics as Moral Grounding for Stakeholder Theory’, Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 6, n° 2 (1996) 133-147.
S. Carmona and A. Grönlund, ‘Learning From Forgetting: An Experiential Study of Two European Car Manufacturers’, Management Learning, vol. 29, n° 1 (1998) 21-38.
Clark, A. Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts, and Representational Change (Boston: MIT Press, 1993).
Coase, R. H. The Nature of the Firm (Paris: Economica, 1937).
Drucker, P. F. The Practice of Management (Harper, 1954).
R. E. Freeman and D. Reed, ‘Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance’, in Huizinga, C. (Ed) Corporate Governance: A Definitive Exploration of the Issues (Los Angeles: University Press, 1983).
E. R. Freeman and W. Evan, ‘Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation’, The Journal of Behavioral  Economics, vol. 19, n° 4 (1990) 337-359.
Freeman, E. R. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984).
M. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78. n° 6 (1973) 1360-1380.
M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, n° 3 (1985) 481-510.
G. E. Greenley and G. R. Foxall, ‘External Moderation of Associations among Stakeholder Orientations and Company Performance’, International Journal of Research in Marketing, vol. 15 (1998) 51-69.
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. Fourth Generation Evaluation (Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1989).
C. Hardy, N. Phillips and T. B. Lawrence, ‘Resources, Knowledge and Influence: The Organizational Effects of Interorganizational Collaboration’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 40, n° 2 (2003) 321-347.
P. Hibbert and C. Huxham, ‘Collaborating to Know? Inter-organizational Engagement and Learning’, AIM Working Paper Series (2004). www.aimresearch.org.
C. W. L. Hill and T. H. Jones, ‘Stakeholder – Agency Theory’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 29, n° 2 (1992) 131-153.
A. Inkpen, ‘Learning, Knowledge Management and Strategic Alliances: So Many Studies, So Many Unanswered Questions’, in Lorange, P. and Contractor, F. (Eds) Cooperative Strategies and Alliances (London: Pergamon, 2002) 267-289.
A. C. Inkpen and E. W. K. Tsang, ‘Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge Transfer’, Academy of Management Review, vol. 30, n° 1 (2005) 146-165.
M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3 (1976) 297-326.
Katz, D. and Kahn, R. L. The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1966).
O. Koll, ‘Stakeholder Value Creation and Firm Success’, Advances in Business Marketing and Purchasing, vol. 12 (2003) 141-262.
Lakoff, G. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Leanna, C. R. and Rousseau, D.M. (Eds) Relational Wealth (Oxford, 2000).
Lin, N., Cook, K. and Burt, R. Social Capital: Theory and Research (Aldine De Gruyter, 2001)
Lorenz, K. The Foundations of Ethology (Springer-Verlag, 1981).
J. M. Lozano, ‘Towards the Relational Corporation: from Managing Stakeholder Relationships to Building Stakeholder Relationships’, Corporate Governance, vol. 5, n° 2 (Emerald Group, 2005) 60-77.
Mead, G. H. Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
J. Méric, ‘L’émergence d’un discourse de l’innovation managériale – le cas du Balanced Scorecard’, Comptabilité, Contrôle, Audit, Special Issue (May 2003) 129-145.
R. K. Mitchell, B. R. Agle and D. J.Wood, ‘Towards a Theory of Stakeholder Identification: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts’, Academy of Management Review, vol. 22, n°4 (1997) 853-886.
C. Mothe and B. Quélin, ‘Creating Competencies Through Collaboration: The Case of Eureka R&D Consortia’, European Management Journal, vol. 18, n° 6 (2000) 590-604.
J. Nahapiet and S. Ghoshal, ‘Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the OrganizationOrganisational Advantage’, Academy of Management Review, vol. 23, n° 2 (1998) 242-266.
A. Neely and C. Adams, ‘Perspectives on Performance: The Performance Prism’, working paper, http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/cbp/downloads/prismarticle.pdf (2002).
Neely, A., Adams, C. and Kennerley, M. The Performance Prism - The Scorecard for Measuring and Managing Business Success (London: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2002).
B. Nooteboom, ‘Learning by Interaction: Absorptive Capacity, Cognitive Distance and Governance’, Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 4 (2000) 69-92.
W. G. Ouchi, ‘Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 25 (March 1980) 129-141.
J. E. Post, L. E. Preston and S. Sachs, ‘Managing the Extended Entreprise: The New Stakeholder View’, California Management Review, vol. 45, n° 1 (2002) 6-28.
E. Rosch, ‘Principles of Categorization’ in Rosch, E. and Lloyd B. (Eds), Cognition and Categorization (Hillsdale, 1978) 27-48.
Rousseau, J.-J. Le Contrat Social, Translated by Cranston, M. (London: Penguin Books, 1968).
Simon, H. A., Models of Man, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957).
S. G. Sutton and V. Arnold, ‘Deconstructing Economic Stakeholder Theories or Is Might really Right?’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.  9 (1998) 251-260.
H. Tsoukas, and E. Vladimirou, ‘What is Organizational Knowledge?’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 38, n° 7 (2002) 973-993.
Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press,1994).
Wellman, B. Networks in the Global Village (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1999).
E. Wenger, ‘Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems’, Organization, vol. 7, n° 2 (2000) 225-246.
D. Windsor, ‘The Definition of Stakeholder Status’, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Association for Business and Society, (IABS), Kona-Kailua, Hawaii (1998).










































































^1	  The author would like to acknowledge the support of the ESRC/EPSRC Advanced Institute of Management Research under grant number RES-331-25-0024 for this research.
